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'RETURN' MIGRATION INTENTIONS AMONG SECOND-GENERATION TURKS IN EUROPE: THE EFFECT OF INTEGRATION AND TRANSNATIONALISM IN A CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

TINEKE FOKKEMA
Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute, The Hague

Data from The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) project were used to examine the determinants of 'return' intentions among the Turkish second generation in several European cities. Theory-derived hypotheses on the effects of economic and socio-cultural integration and transnational ties, and their variation according to policy regimes, were tested. The results highlight the dominance of transnational and socio-cultural integration factors. Turkish second-generation migrants who had strong transnational ties with their parents' country of origin, *and* those who were well-integrated in socio-cultural terms, were more inclined to 'return'. Interestingly, the level of economic integration had no significant effect. Although 'return' intentions varied across countries with different immigration and integration policies, no strong evidence was found for an interaction effect of policy regimes on the likelihood to express a 'return' intention.

Introduction

Return migration is not a new phenomenon in social sciences and public debate. For instance, in the 1960s and early 1970s—a period of unprecedented economic growth and severe labour shortages in North-West Europe—low-skilled and unskilled workers were recruited from relatively poor Mediterranean countries such as Turkey, Morocco, Italy and Spain (Castles and Kosack 1973). These so-called guestworkers were expected to return home after a few years of hard work and frugal living, and invest their savings in housing, agriculture and other business activities in their home country. Despite the 1973 Oil Crisis and the subsequent economic downturn, however, many of the guestworkers postponed their return journey to an indefinite date, as was testified by large-scale family reunification migration (i.e. bringing in members of the immediate family) in the 1970s and 1980s and family

formation migration (i.e. bringing new partners from the country of origin) in the mid-1980s and 1990s.

Because of the prolongation of stay and subsequent migration of relatives to Europe, the focus of research moved away from 'return migration' towards the economic and socio-cultural incorporation of immigrants and their direct descendants (the so-called second generation) into host societies. Contrary to first belief, full assimilation into mainstream culture and society did not take place for the majority of the migrants. Transnationalism, a term introduced into the migration literature by a group of social anthropologists in the early 1990s (Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992), became a popular explanation: due to advances in technology and communication systems (e.g. telephone, internet, cheap and efficient air transport, globalised banking systems), immigrants and their offspring are able to maintain social and economic ties with their society of origin which foster multiple belongings and double loyalties and hence, obstruct assimilation (Portes 2001). However, an increasing number of empirical studies show that integration and maintaining transnational ties are not necessarily substitutes, but can be complements (e.g. Guarnizo *et al.* 2003, Mazzucato 2008, Morawska 2003, Snel *et al.* 2006).

Recently, there has been renewed attention in research and policy on return migration (Cassarino 2004, Olesen 2002). The main reasons for this revived interest are: new migration instruments to fill particular labour market shortages while avoiding past policy failures to prevent permanent settlement of immigrants (Castles 2006, Ruhs 2006); ongoing evidence for the beneficial role in economic development of return migrants (de Haas 2005, Ghosh 2006); an increasing number of first-generation migrants approaching retirement age (White 2006); and a far less favourable social and political climate for foreigners, especially for Muslims, in the aftermath of 9/11 (EUMC 2005, Sides and Citrin 2007). Most recent studies on return migration have focused on the effects of integration and/or transnationalism on the decision whether or not to go home (e.g. Constant and Massey 2002, Haug 2008, Jensen and Pedersen 2007, Potter *et al.* 2005). With regard to integration and return migration, no unidirectional links arise, which is not surprising as conflicting hypotheses can be formulated from classical migration theories—as we will see presently.

Despite this resurgence of scientific and policy interest in return migration, knowledge of migrants' intentions and decisions to return, and the underlying factors behind such behaviour, is still limited. This is in part due to the method and scope of previous studies. Firstly, recent research on return migration has been dominated by *qualitative* (ethnographic) studies, focusing on a particular group of first- or second-generation returnees (e.g. Christou

2006, de Haas and Fokkema 2010, Ley and Kobayashi 2005, Potter 2005). While this approach undoubtedly has its merits, including the ability to provide comprehensive and detailed information on the phenomenon and to uncover realities beneath appearances, it also has certain constraints. The primary limitation is that, unlike quantitative research, the findings are not generalisable to the entire population under study. Secondly, previous *quantitative* return migration studies have focused primarily on first-generation migrants and the effect of host-country factors in general, and on economic integration in particular, neglecting the likely different mechanisms for second-generation migrants and ignoring the possible impact of socio-cultural integration in the host society and transnational ties with the country of origin. Finally, despite calls of pioneering researchers (such as Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, Portes 1999) for more cross-national comparisons, nearly all empirical research on the determinants of return intentions and migration has been carried out at the national level, thereby not allowing researchers to examine the impact of different migration policies across countries (Doomernik and Jandl 2008). One of the main reasons for this is undoubtedly the lack of (accessibility to) relevant cross-national survey data.

In this article, I attempt to reduce part of this gap in existing knowledge, at least for second-generation Turks in the European context, by quantitatively examining the determinants of their 'return' migration intentions with a special focus on the effect of integration, transnational ties, and policy regimes.[1] I use new pooled data from the The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) survey, a large-scale European comparative survey focusing exclusively on second-generation migrants. The research questions are twofold. First, does the level of integration and transnational ties have an effect on return migration intention among the Turkish second generation in Europe? And second, do these effects vary according to the integration policy of the country in which second-generation Turks live?

Theory and Hypotheses

The Effect of Integration

It is common practice to make a distinction between economic (structural) and socio-cultural integration. Economic integration refers to the socio-economic position of the migrant in society, primarily in terms of education, employment and occupational attainment. Socio-cultural integration, on the other hand, refers to informal social contacts with natives and the endorsement of society's prevailing moral standards and values (Snel *et al.* 2006: 287). Although

economic and socio-cultural integration are conceptually distinct, they are often not independent of one another (Bean *et al.* 2010), which entails the likelihood that they have a mutual positive influence on each other. For instance, fluency in the mainstream society language will usually improve educational attainment and open up employment opportunities, while interethnic social contacts can help in finding employment (Lancee 2010).

What is the likely effect of integration on the return migration intention of second-generation Turks? No one-way effect can be expected in advance as opposite hypotheses can be formulated stemming from different theories. Neoclassical economic theory (NE) views international migration as a cost-benefit decision, with actors deciding to stay or migrate in order to maximise expected net lifetime earnings (Sjaastad 1962, Todaro 1976). Accordingly, at first glance, it might be assumed that second-generation return migrants will be *negatively* selected with respect to integration. Human capital—including education, work experience and profession—increases one's potential earnings at the current country of residence and is likely to be imperfectly rewarded in the parents' country of origin as human capital is usually difficult to transfer across countries. Second-generation migrants who are less successful economically, on the other hand, benefit less from the relatively high capital-skill complementarities and skilled wages in developed countries, and hence will be more likely to migrate to the relatively poorer origin country of their parents in order to minimise their living costs. Although NE theory obviously concentrates on economic integration, effects in the same direction can also be expected with regard to socio-cultural integration: the less socio-culturally integrated, the lower the psychological costs of cutting off social ties and friendships, learning a new language, and adapting to a new lifestyle and culture. This reasoning leads to the hypothesis that:

- *H1a – Second-generation Turks who are less integrated in economic and/or socio-cultural terms are more likely to have return intentions compared to second-generation Turks who are more successful on these dimensions.*

Statistical discrimination theory, however, casts doubts as to whether high-skilled second-generation migrants in general are able to optimally benefit from their qualifications. Statistical discrimination theory, pioneered by Arrow (1973), McCall (1972) and Phelps (1972), refers to employers' tendency to look at the real or perceived characteristics of a group and treat all members of the group accordingly. In other words, those applying for a (higher-qualified) job are not judged on their own merits alone but on their origin as well. Consequently, due to employers' overall negative views

about the work ethic and productivity of immigrants and their offspring, high-skilled second-generation migrants often have difficulty finding work that matches their qualifications and enables them to reach the top of their professions (Waldinger *et al.* 1998). Hence, feelings of frustration among high-skilled second-generation migrants about employers' negative attitudes, perceptions of promotion unfairness and the existence of a 'glass ceiling' may increase their likelihood of (return) migration. Doubts can also be expressed about the NE assumption at the other side of the spectrum. Given Europe's social safety net—such as unemployment or disability benefits, healthcare, family allowances, and housing subsidies for low-income families—it is highly questionable whether earnings of low-skilled second-generation migrants will be higher if they migrate to their parents' country. The above leads to the contrasting hypothesis that:

- *H1b – Second-generation Turks who are well-integrated in economic terms are more likely to have return intentions compared to second-generation Turks who are less successful economically.*

The Effect of Transnational Ties

In its traditional formulation, assimilation theory argues that it is impossible to avoid full assimilation into the culture one is surrounded with, and that over time, immigrants increasingly resemble the norms, values, behaviours and characteristics of natives and lose their interest in the country of origin (Gordon 1964). New versions of the theory realise that full assimilation may be more difficult and take longer than originally presumed (Alba and Nee 2003, Waters and Jiménez 2005). Discrimination based on ethnicity and/or religion and institutional barriers to employment and other opportunities may hinder integration and foster ethnic identity and culture retention. These external obstacles depend on several factors like national origins, socio-economic status and family resources, with different rates and types of assimilation (across ethnic groups) as a result (Portes *et al.* 2005, Waldinger and Feliciano 2004).

In line with this change, most migration scholars nowadays acknowledge that transnational practices, social relationships and identity have been and continue to be an integral part of the life of many first-generation migrants (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). Less consensus exists, however, on the continuity of transnationalism among second and subsequent generations. Some predict that transnationalism will decline rapidly among migrants' descendants mainly because of a decrease in language fluency and lack of meaningful connections

to their parents' country of origin (e.g. Alba and Nee 2003, Lucassen 2006, Zhou 1997). Others expect that transnational involvements may endure among later generations as they often live within a transnational social field (e.g. Eckstein and Barberia 2002, Fouron and Glick Schiller 2002, Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). For instance, migrants' children are raised in households where ideas, norms, practices and identities from the country of origin are present on a daily basis, and they often marry someone of the same ancestry.

According to transnationalists, and in line with the social network theory (Boyd 1989, Massey *et al.* 1998), cross-border linkages and multiple allegiances have a bearing on the likelihood of return migration (Cassarino 2004). For instance, maintaining strong economic attachments—through sending remittances and investments—and social relationships with relatives and friends—through regular visits and frequent contact—in their country of origin, allows the mobilisation of resources and information needed to secure and prepare the return. In addition, once returned, the social network increases the feasibility or likelihood of getting support. Furthermore, utilising ethnic, bicultural and bilingual skills facilitates the adaptation of the returnees to their new home environment (Ruble 2005). The same arguments might apply to second-generation migrants, leading to the following hypothesis:

- *H2 – Second-generation Turks who have strong transnational ties are more likely to have return intentions compared to second-generation Turks who have weak transnational ties.*

Variation between Countries

European countries have historically used different policies to deal with other nationalities and to incorporate their newcomers. This has incited many researchers to develop cross-country typologies of integration regimes (e.g. Castles and Miller 1998, Hammar 1985, Koopmans and Statham 2000, Koopmans *et al.* 2005, Penninx *et al.* 2004). Most of these typologies are built along two dimensions: 'ethnic-civic' and 'monism-pluralism' (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2009). The position on the ethnic-civic dimension determines the degree to which immigrants are seen as members of the nation and receive the same individual rights as the host population. The monism-pluralism dimension reflects the extent to which immigrants are allowed and encouraged to retain their ethnic and cultural identity. Despite using different methods of analysis and data, usually three national integration models have been identified across European countries: exclusionist,

assimilationist, and multicultural. Moreover, notwithstanding changes in societies and policies throughout the years, the ranking of European countries and hence the clusters of countries with similar rankings have remained fairly unchanged.

The *exclusionist* model is characterised by rigid and restrictive immigration legislation and policies aimed at artificially maintaining the temporary character of immigrant settlement (the guestworker system) and avoiding welfare dependence. In this context, 'rigid' and 'restrictive' refer mainly to the high barriers for migrants to become full citizens, like limited access to nationality based on *ius sanguinis* (citizenship by blood line), [2] denying rights to political participation, making residence rights dependent on performance on the labour market and absence of a criminal record, and limited options for the maintenance of cultural specificity (Koopmans 2008). The European countries that generally are considered to belong to this model are Austria, Switzerland and, despite the new law on naturalisation in 1999, Germany.[3]

The *assimilationist* model has equality as its core—individuals are citizens and citizens are equals before the law (civic individualism)—but that equality requires citizens to embrace the dominant national values and perceived common identity, thus putting aside their ethnic differences. Newcomers are given relatively easy access to citizenship and hence to all other rights, as long as they are prepared to accept the political institutions of the country. No special provisions are created for those who do not wish to naturalise. No specific public services are available for migrants to live according to their traditions and customs, in order to accelerate full assimilation into the dominant society and to prevent ethnic or religious group formation. Notwithstanding changes in nationality legislation in 1998, France is the classic example of this model.[4]

In the *multicultural* model, a civic conception of citizenship is combined with a pluralistic view of cultural obligations. Migrants can relatively easily obtain full citizenship rights, security of residence and state support, even in the case of welfare dependency or conviction for crimes (Koopmans 2008). Unlike the assimilationist model, however, they do not have to pay the price for that by abandoning their ethnic heritage in favour of adopting the cultural codes of the dominant society. On the contrary, the multicultural model is based on respect for cultural diversity and protection for the identity of immigrant communities. As a result, provisions are made to retain cultural differences by, for instance, supporting ethnic or religious group formation and granting special rights or exempting some cultural groups from certain obligations. Countries that have traditionally followed

this model are Sweden, the Netherlands, and the Flemish part of Belgium (Jacobs and Rea 2007), although the post-9/11 period has brought reversals in the idea of multiculturalism and related policies.

An interesting question is whether the expected effects of integration and transnationalism on return orientations among second-generation Turks, as described earlier, vary across the different policy regimes. In countries with a multicultural approach, neither economic nor socio-cultural integration is necessary for migrants to enjoy rights including access to welfare-state benefits and services. Moreover, as cultural differences are respected and valued in these countries, maintaining strong transnational ties is not an impediment for societal engagement and incorporation. This stands in sharp contrast with countries with an exclusionist or assimilationist approach where giving up their interest in the country of origin, culture, language and customs and adopting the mainstream ones are prerequisites for labour force participation which, in turn, gives access to welfare and other rights. In other words, the material and non-material costs of being economically unsuccessful, and maintaining ethnic and transnational ties are higher in the latter countries than in countries with a multicultural approach. I therefore hypothesise that:

- *H3 – The expected negative (H1a) or positive (H1b) effect of integration and the positive (H2) effect of transnationalism on return migration intentions are less pronounced in countries with a predominant multicultural approach than in countries with a more exclusionist or assimilationist approach.*

Data and Methods

Data Source

The data stem from the aforementioned TIES project, a collaborative and comparative research project on the lives of second-generation individuals of Turkish, Moroccan and Yugoslavian descent in 15 cities in eight European countries.[5] In this project, a survey was conducted during 2007 and 2008 among approximately 10,000 respondents aged 18 to 35 years, including 3,750 persons belonging to native control groups. An identical questionnaire was used in all cities, which made it possible to pool the data sets. In all participating countries, the same sample inclusion criteria were used: respondents were selected if they were born in the survey country and if at least one of their parents was born in Turkey, Morocco and former Yugoslavia. The survey, however, did not have a uniform sampling design. While in the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden population registers were used, the method

of surname-recognition using phone books was the only feasible sampling frame available for France, Germany, Switzerland and Austria.[6]

To circumvent problems of comparability, I focus in this paper on one second-generation group, Turks, living in one of the following countries and cities: the Netherlands (Amsterdam and Rotterdam), Belgium (Brussels and Antwerp), Sweden (Stockholm), France (Paris and Strasbourg), Germany (Berlin and Frankfurt), Switzerland (Zurich and Basle), and Austria (Vienna and Linz).[7] A secondary advantage of sticking to this migrant group is that Turkey, unlike Morocco, has never been colonised nor shares a language with any of the participating countries. It has to be said, however, that patterns of Turkish migration were not similar between European countries: there are concentrations of Turks from different regions of Turkey across Europe. For instance, a significant part of the Turks in Sweden and Belgium originate from rural areas in Central Anatolia (Kulu and Afyon-Emirdağ, respectively), while many in Germany are from more urbanised, western parts of Turkey (Bayram *et al.* 2009, Kaya and Kentel 2007). These differences in regional origins reflect variations not only in degree of urbanisation and, partly related to that, level of education, but also in ethnic composition, culture and religion. For example, Alevism, a heterodox religious identity, is peculiar to Anatolia (Kaya and Kentel 2007).

Measuring Instruments

The dependent variable, *return migration intention*, is measured by the question: 'Do you intend to live in Turkey in the future for a period of one year of longer?' with the response categories: 0-certainly not, 1-possibly, 2-likely, 3-certainly, and 4-don't know. Those who answered 'don't know' were not included in the final analyses. The independent variables relate to various measures of integration and transnationalism, whilst migration policy functions as a dummy variable.

Socio-economic status is often used to gauge *economic integration*. In this study, socio-economic status is measured by four variables: educational attainment, labour force participation, occupational attainment, and difficulties with income. *Educational attainment* reflects the highest level of education the respondents had completed by obtaining a qualification or diploma. To make educational attainment comparable across countries, national educational system qualifications were transformed into harmonised educational codes, ranging from 1-primary school graduation to 4-completion of tertiary education. With regard to labour force participation, respondents who had no paid job (=reference group) were compared with those who were either *wage-employed*

or *self-employed*. Respondents who (ever) had a paid job were also asked to describe their current or last occupation. The occupations were coded according to the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI, Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996) of occupational status, with the variable *occupational attainment* as result, running from 16 (e.g. domestic workers, cleaners and launderers, agricultural and fishery labourers) to 88 (medical doctors). The mean ISEI-score by country of residence and gender was attributed to those who had never worked.

The survey data comprise several dimensions of *socio-cultural integration*: identification, language proficiency and use, interethnic social contacts, participation in organisations of ethnic signature, and religious practices. With regard to identification, *feelings of national belonging* and *feelings of being Turkish* were examined, as the two sets of feelings are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Schneider *et al*. 2011). The belonging-questions had six answering categories, ranging from 0-no feelings at all to 5-very strong feelings. With regard to language, the respondents were asked to rate their *skills in Turkish* on a 6-point scale ranging from 0-bad to 5-excellent. Additionally, the respondents were asked which language they use, if applicable, in four different family settings: with their siblings, mother, father, and current/last partner. The response categories ranged from 'mostly the language of the country of residence' to 'mostly Turkish'. The scores on these five items were converted into one summary scale, reflecting the degree of *use of the Turkish language*, ranging from to 0-always using the language of the country of residence, to 1-always using the Turkish language. The variable *interethnic social contacts* indicates how many friends the respondent had among native citizens, running from 1-none to 3-many. To get insight into the *participation in Turkish organisations*, a list of organisations was presented to the respondents. After indicating whether or not they had participated in each organisation in the past year, they were asked in which of these organisations the activities are mostly oriented towards the Turkish community. Respondents exclusively participating in organisations where the activities are oriented towards the Turkish community, were considered to be least integrated (score: 2). Respondents who were exclusively active in organisations where no activities are oriented towards the Turkish community were considered as most integrated (score: 0). The score of 1 is reserved for the remaining respondents. The degree of *religious practices* was measured by using four questions, relating to mosque attendance, fasting during the last Ramadan, eating halal food, and daily praying, each with 5-point scales. An aggregate score (the mean of the four items) was created with higher scores meaning engagement in more religious practices.

Next I deal with *transnationalism*. The survey included a number of questions aimed at capturing respondents' attachments to their parents' country of origin. With regard to economic ties, the respondents were asked whether they had either remitted money or invested money in business or real estate in the past five years in their parents' country of origin. Accordingly, the two dummy variables *remittances* and *investment* (0=no, 1=yes) were created. Insight into social ties was gathered by asking the respondents how many times they had visited their parents' country in the last five years. The answers to the *visiting* question were grouped into seven categories, ranging from 0-0 times to 6-several times a year. Finally, the respondents were asked what kind of TV stations they watched. Based on this information, the variable *watching Turkish TV stations* was created, with the following answer categories: 0-only host-country-language stations, 1-as much host-country as Turkish TV stations, 2-mostly Turkish TV stations, and 3-only Turkish TV stations.

Furthermore, four *socio-demographic characteristics* that are known to have an effect on return migration were included as control variables in the analyses: respondent's *age* (in years) at the time of completion of the questionnaire, the two dummy variables *man* and *children* with the male respondents and those having children, respectively, being the reference group, and the variable *partner*. With regard to the latter, respondents with no partner (=reference group) were compared with those living with a *first-generation partner*, a *second-generation partner*, or a *partner from another nationality* (including native partner).

To examine whether the expected effects of integration and transnational ties on 'return' migration intention vary across different policy regimes, the dummy variable *multicultural policies*, distinguishing the participating countries with a more multicultural approach (Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium) from those with a more exclusionist or assimilationist approach (Austria, Switzerland, Germany and France), was created as well as its interactions with the integration- and transnationalism-variables.

Table 1 provides descriptive information on all variables, in total as well as separately for the seven participating host countries.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics (means) of dependent and independent variables

	Range	Total	Netherlands	Belgium	Sweden	France	Germany	Switzerland	Austria
Return migration intention	0-3	0.75	0.87	0.86	0.58	1.13	0.44	0.53	0.79
Control of variables									
Age	18-35	24.83	24.72	26.07	25.70	23.68	26.03	23.71	23.18
Man	0/1	0.49	0.45	0.54	0.49	0.42	0.48	0.51	0.51
Partner									
First generation	0/1	0.22	0.33	0.38	0.19	0.23	0.10	0.19	0.09
Second generation	0/1	0.11	0.08	0.09	0.12	0.04	0.26	0.06	0.10
Other nationality	0/1	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.12	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.00
Children	0/1	0.28	0.37	0.44	0.07	0.26	0.32	0.18	0.16
Economic integration									
Educational attainment	1-5	3.60	3.62	3.73	4.13	3.92	2.90	3.67	3.50
Labour force participation									
Wage-employed	0/1	0.61	0.62	0.45	0.72	0.53	0.60	0.80	0.62
Self-employed	0/1	0.02	0.00	0.10	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00
Occupational attainment	16-88	40.59	43.48	37.72	41.23	40.94	37.02	44.92	41.22
Difficulties with income	0-4	2.77	2.52	2.82	3.29	3.00	2.58	2.86	2.33
Socio-cultural integration									
Feelings of national belonging	0-4	2.40	2.14	2.81	2.20	2.20	2.41	2.38	2.41
Feelings of being Turkish	0-4	3.08	3.12	3.40	2.88	3.27	2.96	2.83	2.80
Skills in Turkish language	0-6	4.67	4.43	4.73	4.48	4.72	4.66	4.78	4.74
Use of Turkish language	0-1	0.41	0.52	0.31	0.45	0.49	0.27	0.46	0.50
Interethnic social contacts	0-3	1.94	1.53	1.90	1.85	2.14	1.71	2.20	2.27
Participation in Turkish organisations	0-2	0.43	0.52	0.47	0.32	0.46	0.42	0.30	0.54
Religious practices	0-1	0.43	0.53	0.54	0.23	0.48	0.42	0.25	0.45
Transnational ties									
Remittances	0/1	0.23	0.31	0.31	0.24	0.31	0.14	0.18	0.11
Investment	0/1	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.05
Visiting Turkey	0-4	1.79	1.95	1.89	1.65	2.00	1.33	2.12	1.53
Watching Turkish TV stations	0-3	0.91	0.83	1.11	0.69	1.65	0.52	0.57	0.85

Source:TIES-data 2007-2008.

Results

In order to test the validity of the hypotheses specified earlier, a stepwise multivariate regression analysis on return migration intention was carried out. Table 2 presents the results of this analysis. Model 1 is the base model with only the control variables and country dummies. Models 2 to 4 subsequently incorporate economic integration, socio-cultural integration and transnational ties factors. In the next step of the analysis, all independent variables are taken into account (Model 5). The final model (Model 6) focuses on the interaction between the different policy regimes on the one hand, and economic and socio-cultural integration and transnational ties on the other hand. As noted earlier, the country dummies are therefore replaced by the dummy variable multicultural policies that distinguishes between the host countries with a more multicultural approach and those with a more exclusionist or assimilationist approach. In addition, the economic integration, socio-cultural integration and transnational ties variables are respectively replaced by factor scores derived through principal component analysis.

When only the control variables and country dummies are considered (Model 1), return intentions do not seem to be significantly affected by respondents' age. Differences in the likelihood of having return intentions, however, are found between the sexes: men appeared to be more likely than women to intend to return. Return intentions also seem to be affected by respondents' family status: those with a partner from another nationality and, to some extent, those with children were less likely to express a return intention compared to Turkish second-generation migrants without partners and children. Moreover, the likelihood of return intention varies greatly by respondent's country of residence and the country effects are in line with descriptive findings presented in Table 1. Compared to the average Turkish second-generation migrant, those in the Netherlands, Belgium and France were more likely to intend to return and those living in Sweden, Germany and Switzerland were less so. Those in Austria were close to the overall average.

In Model 2 we test whether there is a significant relationship, either negative (H1a) or positive (H1b), between economic integration and return intentions. The findings are mixed and hence, do not support one hypothesis or the other. While educational attainment appears to be negatively related to the likelihood of having a return intention, which is in line with H1a, no significant relationship is found with occupational attainment. With regard to respondent's labour force participation, there is no difference in the likelihood of having an intention to return between those who were unemployed and those who worked for an employer. Having an own business, however, does trigger thoughts about returning: compared to the Turkish second

Table 2. Determinants of the intention to migrate to parents' country (certainly not – certainly) among Turkish second generation migrants in Europe (unstandardised regression coefficients, N=2,471)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Control variables						
Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01
Man	0.14***	0.13**	0.08*	0.16***	0.09**	0.12**
Partner (ref. no partner)						
First generation	0.08	0.07	-0.04	-0.06	-0.10-	-0.09
Second generation	0.03	0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.06	-0.15*
Other nationality	-0.17*	-0.15-	-0.04	-0.04	0.03	-0.03
Children	-0.10-	-0.14*	-0.13*	-0.11*	-0.14*	-0.06
Economic integration						
Educational attainment		-0.04*			-0.01	
Labour force participation (ref. no paid job)						
Wage-employed		-0.03			0.01	
Self-employed		0.46**			0.41**	
Occupational attainment		0.00			0.00	
Difficulties with income		0.10*			0.13**	
Level of economic integration						0.00
Socio-cultural integration						
Feelings of national belonging			-0.13***		-0.10***	
Feelings of being Turkish			0.07**		0.05*	
Skills in Turkish language			0.06***		0.04*	
Use of Turkish language			0.20*		0.05	
Interethnic social contacts			-0.01		-0.01	
Participation in Turkish organisations			0.02		0.01	
Religious practices			0.32***		0.21**	
Level of socio-cultural integration						0.12***

Transnational ties						
Remittances				0.13**	0.11*	
Investment				0.40***	0.37***	
Visiting Turkey				0.10***	0.08***	
Watching Turkish TV stations				0.19***	0.12***	
Level of transnational ties						0.18***
Multicultural policies[1]						0.38*
Multicultural policies*economic integration						-0.01-
Multicultural policies*socio-cultural integration						-0.04-
Multicultural policies*transnational ties						0.02
Countries[2]						
The Netherlands	0.13**	0.13**	0.06	0.12**	0.07	
Belgium	0.12**	0.09*	0.15***	0.05	0.06	
Sweden	-0.16**	-0.12*	-0.13*	-0.10-	-0.06	
France	0.29***	0.41***	0.31***	0.19***	0.22***	
Germany	-0.27***	-0.31***	-0.25***	-0.13**	-0.17***	
Switzerland	-0.23***	-0.22***	-0.17***	-0.22***	-0.19***	
Austria	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.07	
Adjusted R^2	7.0	7.9	15.3	17.5	21.1	17.2

***p <.001; **p < .001; *p < .05; ~ p < .10

Source: TIES-data 2007–2008.

[1]Countries with multiculural approach: the Netherlands (N=304), Belgium (N=481), Sweden (N=223); Countries with exclusionist or assimilation approach: France (N=404), Germany (N=439), Switzerland (N=377), Austriak (N=243).

[2]Deviation from the 7-country average.

generation without a paid job, their self-employed counterparts had a substantially higher likelihood of return intention, which is in line with H1b. Finally, supporting H1a, the more the Turkish second-generation respondents saw themselves having difficulties to make ends meet, the more likely they were to express a return intention. Having said that, the Turkish second generation's likelihood to intend to return does not depend strongly on their level of economic integration: after data on economic integration have been included, the explained part of the variance increases only from 7.0 to 7.9%.

In line with Hypothesis 1a, socio-cultural integration lowers substantially the likelihood to intend to return, as is shown by the strong increase in the explained part of the variance in Model 3 (15.3%) compared with Model 1 (7.0%). Turkish second-generation migrants who had weak feelings of host-country national belonging, and those who had strong feelings of being Turkish, were more likely to express a return intention. Furthermore, greater return intention is found among those who were more proficient in Turkish and use that language frequently with family. Although the effects of 'interethnic social contacts' and 'participation in Turkish organisations' are in the expected direction, they are not statistically significant. Last but not least, the intention to return is pronounced among those who were more religiously observant. Once the level of socio-cultural integration is accounted for, the previously observed negative effect of having a partner from another nationality as well as the positive effect in the case of Turks in the Netherlands become insignificant. This suggests that the initial lower likelihood of return intentions among the Turkish second generation with a partner from another nationality and the rather high likelihood among the Turkish second generation in the Netherlands, are at least partly the respective result of their higher and their lower levels of socio-cultural integration.

Model 4 shows that all transnationalism variables are highly significant and their effects are in line with the expectations formulated in H2. Those who remitted, who invested in Turkey, who visited Turkey regularly, and who were watching Turkish TV stations frequently, were significantly more inclined to return. Moreover, like socio-cultural integration, the strength of transnational ties has a substantial explanatory power: the explained part of the variance increases significantly from 7.0 (Model 1) to 17.5%. By adding the differences in transnationalism, the differences observed between the Turkish second generation having a partner from another nationality and those having no partner, are no longer significant. This means that the lower inclination to return among the former is at least partly caused by the fact that they had weaker economic and social ties with Turkey. Also the return intentions among the Turkish respondents in Belgium no longer

differ significantly from the average Turkish second generation once the level of transnational ties has been included in the analysis. In other words, Belgium second-generation migrants of Turkish descent had relatively strong transnational ties and this fact as such resulted in a rather high likelihood of return intentions.

Simultaneously including the level of economic and socio-cultural integration and transnational ties neutralises the negative effect of educational attainment and the positive effect of the use of Turkish language with family on proneness to return (Model 5). In this overall model, Turkish second-generation migrants living with a first-generation partner were somewhat (significant at the 0.10 level) less likely to intend to return. With regard to the country differences, those living in France were the most likely to express a return intention, while those in Germany and Switzerland were the least so. The total explained variance of the model was 21.1%.

The last model tests the final hypothesis, namely that the effects of integration and transnationalism on return intention are less pronounced in countries with a predominant multicultural approach (the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden) than in countries with a more exclusionist or assimilationist approach (H3). To some extent, the findings only support this hypothesis with regard to economic and socio-cultural integration. While the effect of transnational ties is not found to be significantly lower in countries with multicultural policies, the associations between multicultural policies and economic and socio-cultural integration are slightly negative (significant at the 0.10 level). In other words, being integrated in economic or socio-cultural terms has a slightly weaker impact on the likelihood of return intentions in countries with a predominant multicultural approach than in countries with a more exclusionist or assimilationist approach. Note, however, that in this model economic integration does not have a significant main effect on return intentions and that the main effect of the policy dummy is positive. The latter suggests that Turkish second-generation migrants living in countries with predominantly multicultural policies were, in general, more likely to express a return intention than their peers living in countries characterised by a more exclusionist or assimilationist approach.

Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research

The aim of this study was to test theory-derived hypotheses on the effect of economic and socio-cultural integration and transnational ties, and its variation according to policy regimes, on return migration intention among the Turkish second generation in several European host countries. Multivariate analyses

showed that low levels of socio-cultural integration and maintaining transnational ties substantially increase the likelihood of expressing a return intention. The level of economic integration, on the other hand, seemed not to have a significant influence on return intention. At the same time, the results suggest that second-generation Turks in countries with predominantly multicultural policies are more inclined to return than their peers in countries with a more exclusionist or assimilationist approach, although, as expected, slightly less so if they are more integrated in economic and socio-cultural terms.

The lack of a general effect of economic integration on return intention, when controlling for other characteristics, is intriguing and needs to be investigated in more detail by future research. While no differences in return intentions were found between unemployed and wage-employed individuals and educational and occupational attainment appeared to have no effect, self-employment and income difficulties did so. Their effects, however, were not in the same direction: a higher likelihood of return intention was found among the self-employed, compared to the unemployed, and among those who perceived greater difficulties to make ends meet. An explanation for the positive effect of self-employment may be that the self-employed Turkish second generation under study disproportionally represent the more talented, ambitious, independent, and adventure-seeking people. Another explanation might be that they face too many rules and regulations for small businesses in the country of residence and/or have specific occupational profiles that create more opportunities in Turkey. A possible reason for a higher likelihood of return intention among the respondents having difficulties with their income is that, in line with the NE theory, they might expect to lower their living costs by moving to Turkey.

The evidence for a generally higher likelihood of expressing a return intention among respondents in countries with predominantly multicultural policies also needs to be further explored, together with the weaker than expected effect of the interaction between the different policy regimes and level of integration. Further research using a richer dataset is recommended since the number of countries and cases by country were too small in this study to address a particular country's peculiarities and to draw any firm conclusions. More specifically, it would be interesting to examine whether specific features of multicultural policies entail side-effects that trigger return migration. One may think in this respect of their more favourable and better protected opportunity contexts for migrants (e.g. providing more tangible and intangible support for migrants, more openness and multi-dimensionality of opportunity structures) that may foster greater sensitivities to possibilities of discrimination and eventually to perceptions of more

discrimination. Moreover, greater and more secure opportunities are likely to lead to higher educational and labour market aspirations and more stringent 'success' criteria. So, if second-generation migrants in countries with multicultural policies persistently face ethnic discrimination and other exclusion mechanisms affecting their socio-cultural and economic integration and mobility in a negative way, they might be prone to return. This might also mean that it is not the absolute levels of education and occupational achievement themselves (like this study suggests) that matter, but rather the (perceived) gap between the actual position on the labour market and qualifications/skills held.

The focus of this study was restricted to second-generation individuals of Turkish descent. Hence, another direction of future research is to compare the main determinants of return intentions between different second-generation migrant groups. In this respect, it is also highly recommended to examine the role of specific features of the parental country. Examples of questions that are interesting in this context are the following: Are countries with the lowest living costs attracting more second-generation migrants? Are well-integrated second-generation migrants more likely to intend to return to countries with strong economic prospects and a favourable climate for entrepreneurship?

This study has yielded considerable insight into the determinants of return migration *intentions* among second-generation Turks. The question remains, of course, to what extent these potential returnees will *actually return* to their parents' country of birth. Perhaps even more important is to find out whether actual return migration behaviour is affected by the same factors as a desire to return. There might be specific social, economic and political barriers that hinder a definite return. Future data collection in which second-generation migrants are followed over time should examine this issue.

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Notes

1. Strictly speaking, it is not a return—they are born and raised in Europe—but a move to their parents' country of birth. For the protagonists themselves, however, it is an ontological sense of return to a point of origin, their ethnic homeland (King and Christou 2010). Therefore, and for the sake of simplicity, I use the term return throughout this article.
2. *Ius sanguinis* is the principle for acquisition of citizenship by parentage, so that second and subsequent generations of immigrant descent will grow up as foreign nationals in their country of birth and may even be deported to their parents' country of origin.
3. In 1999, Germany adopted a new law that introduced *ius soli* by giving citizenship at birth to any child born in the German territory to a parent with eight years of legal residence.
4. In 1998, the principle of the *double droit du sol* was reintroduced in France, which not only gives automatic citizenship to third-generation children born in France, but also second-generation children born in France who have five years' residence and a clean criminal record can acquire citizenship at the age of 18, or as early as 16, if they request to do so.
5. The TIES project is coordinated by Maurice Crul and Jens Schneider, affiliated to the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands. The survey was carried out by survey bureaux under supervision of the nine national TIES partner institutes: IMES and the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) in the Netherlands; the Institute for Social and Political Opinion Research (ISPO) of the University of Leuven in Belgium; the National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) in France; the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (SFM) of the University of Neuchâtel in Switzerland; the Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations (CEIFO) of the University of Stockholm in Sweden; the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) of the University of Osnabrück in Germany; the Institute for the Study of Migration (IEM) of the Pontifical Comillas University of Madrid in Spain; and the Institute for European Integration Research (EIF) of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Austria. See for further information on the TIES project and country documentation: www.tiesproject.eu.
6. In France, population registers do not include information on parents' country of birth, while in Germany, Switzerland and Austria strict data protection laws prevent access to population register data.
7. Overall this combined Turkish sample comprises 3,268 cases, approximately 250 per city. The pooled sample reduces to 2,471 due to missing values on certain variables. Spain (Madrid and Barcelona) was excluded as no second-generation Turks were interviewed in this country.
8. Social ties are increasingly forged and maintained by new communication technologies such as e-mail, Skype, Facebook, My Space and Twitter. Unfortunately, the TIES dataset does not contain any information about this social media use.

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